View source for Computer upload argument for multiplicity

[[Computer upload argument for multiplicity]]

It has been argued that if we can just learn what we are in terms of technical computer algorithms we could upload ourselves into a computer and be immortal or at least live past our human body's death.

If you can reproduce your [[ixperiencitness]] as a [[computer algorithm]] and upload it into one computer you could do it into any number of computers as well. This is a clear case of multiplicity of self as predicted in awaretheory. If this person unique algorithm can exist now it can also exist anytime in the future or past as well. Consequently, you can exist as you are now anytime in the future or past as the awaretheory predicts with the [[historality concept]] and [[futurality concept]].

For singularity of the a human specific algorithm to exist there has to be some unique quality about this algorithm that cannot be duplicated once it is created and uploaded. Computer algorithms do not seem to have this non duplicatability property as any one that sell or buys computer programs knows. Some may say that it is the complexity of the algorithm that allows it not to be determined and uploaded more than once. This is a very weak argument that suffers from the case that just because we can not do it now does not mean it is impossible to do with enough knowledge and technology. It seems very likely that if you can determine the algorithm that would produce a specific [[consciousness]] and [[ixperiencitness]] you could also store this information in many different relatively simple ways.

Then there is the case of versions of this algorithm. There are many parts of every algorithm. Sometimes very small changes to an algorithm make the computer program not work where as at other times small change make the program better. Any computer program that has sensory output like pictures or sound can be changed in small ways without the over all computer programs performance being changed. For instance the color of one pixel may not be noticed at all. So a change in a human algorithm of one equivalent pixel will not change the [[ixperiencitness]]  or [[consciousness]] of the computerized person either.  There should be many different versions of the computer program that produces the same [[consciousnesses]] and [[ixperiencitness]] of the person. There should be even more versions of the computer program that produces a different variation of the consciousness but the same [[ixperiencitness]].

If we consider the fact that the algorithm that represents a person over his life time changes, there are many versions of algorithms that will produce a person consciousness at each point in this life. Since there will be a versions of the algorithm for a person or you that correspond to future points in the person' or your life, if these algorithms are created it will be versions of this person or you in the future that has never existed in reality before, existing now.

We can define the [[algorithmpath]] as the alorgithm of a person that if loaded into a specifc computer and then run produces a specific [[consciousness]] and [[ixperiencitness]] over time. [[algorithmpoint]]

The [[algorithmpath]] will change as the computer that it is loaded into changes for the same person's [[ixperiencitness]].

It is just not now that is important


See also: [[itofazarguments]], [[itofazarguments superlist]], [[itofazanalogies]], [[itofazanalogies superlist]],		

[[Argument against immortality]], [[Argument concept]], [[Argument for coherence for itoextension]], [[Argument for multiplicity of the ixperiencitness concept]],  [[Argument for simplicity for itoextension]], [[Arguments against the universality of conscious existence]], [[Arguments for and agianst singularity]], [[Arguments for immortality]],	[[Arguments for itomultiplicity]], [[Arguments for life after death]],	[[Arguments for multiplicity]],	[[Arguments for singularity]], [[itoarguments]]