Philosophical assimilation

The concept of Philosophical assimilation is sometimes used to restrict or put controls on the concept of personal identity by putting artificial requirements on the speed of replacement of matter in philosophical experiments. The instant replacement of matter within a person where the person continues to have the same consciousness and ixperiencitness is not allowed by most philosophers because it is the replacement of the original with a cidentireplica not the continuation of the original. If you replace the original with the cidentireplica you can still have the original existing with all of its matter in tact and functioning identically to the cidentireplica. Thus you have two separate bodies that have the same consciousness and ixperiencitness making a case of itomultiplicity, which leads to itoimmortality.

There are a number of reasons that philosophical assimilation has been developed. One reason is to maintain the singularity of the self. We know that the body is constantly exchanging matter with external sources thus we know that the self is not dependent on any particular matter. But to maintain the self when it is not the particular matter of the body that is important, what is it that is important? It is then proposed that some process is happening in the body that makes the incoming matter unique to making this particular person and no other person when it is within this person. We also know that matter from another person can be put into to any other person, so what makes any particular grouping of matter produce one specific person and not some one else? What do we mean by a person? Is the person defined as a continuous conscious body over time? But a person is not constantly conscious. We could say that a person has continuity or sameness of consciousness when they are consciousness. But then dreams are very different than the consciousness that we experience when awake. There is a need for a concept like ixperiencitness to define the self over space and time, and variations in consciousness. I am every thing that I am experiencing. But you will experience things that you are not presently experiencing and have experienced things that you are not presently experiencing. You are everything that you are experiencing and can and have experienced. Using this definition of the self rather than the concept of the same person, there is nothing illogical or irrational in other bodies producing the same ixperiencitness. Philosophical assimilation puts a speed limit on how fast matter can be replaced in the body. Natural chemical assimilation in the body has limits on how fast matter can be replaced because it takes time for matter to travel in the body to where it will be used and then it takes time for the chemical reactions to occur and then it take time for the matter to be moved to places where it will be excreted from the cell and then the body. We can also imagine replacing whole body parts like an arm or leg skin or organs. How fast can we imagine doing this and still have the same person? If the body parts are not chemically enough alike the body will reject them but if the parts were from another body with the same DNA the rejections will not be as bad, if at all. If all of the body except the brain was replaced with exactly the same body of the same age and same DNA, same size of parts etc., so the resulting body was exactly like the body was before death will this be the same person? Does it matter how fast this process happens? What if just the brain is replaced with the brain of a cidentireplica? There are numerous experiments that can be imagined with exchanging body parts with one or more cidentireplicas. The identireplica theory of consciousness predicts that all cidentireplicas of the original will have the same ixperiencitness and all cidentireplicas that come from a combination of the matter from any of the cidentireplicas with or without the original body parts will have the same ixperiencitness also. Each successful combination of cidentireplica body parts producing a different cidentireplica produces a body and a different person but the same consciousness and ixperiencitness. It is, however, assumed by most philosophers and other thinkers that a different body will always produce a different ixperiencitness. How then is the self going to be defined as a particular body producing a particular ixperiencitness or all of the bodies that will produce the same ixperiencitness?

If the assumption is that every cidentireplica of an original produces a different ixperiencitness even though every cidentireplica is producing the exact same behavior as the original and thus can report that they are experiencing the same consciousness, and if the assumption is that the brain produces the ixperiencitness then what happens to the ixperiencitness of the different cidentireplicas when parts of their brain are switched in endless patterns between the different cidentireplicas? Does it make new ixperiencitnesses at each recombination. What happens when the original parts from the original cidentireplicas are recombined? Is the original ixperiencitness restored? If this is the case, is it also the case than every newly created ixperiencitness can be remade also by recombining the parts that made the particular new ixperiencitness. How much of the brain or body needs to be replaced to produce a new ixperiencitness? Any such theory becomes very complex.

Can you divide or combine ixperiencitnesses?

see also: simplicity arguments fission arguments fusion experiments, fusion arguments, fission experiments, Fusion of bodies arguments Fission speed, Ixpefission experiments Fusion of bodies arguments, Simplicity argument for multiplicity