C4.MENTAL
file c4.mental.ident Updated 9:11 am May 29, 1994 10: January 12, 1992 / 11:55 am October 31, 1991 1:45 pm October 30, 1988/ 11:34 am November 3, 1988
CHAPTER 4
MENTAL IDENTITY
Topics to be covered in this chapter: What is mental identity? What determines mental identity? Why is mental identity important? How does mental identity relate to the identity theory? Mental identity is defined as identity of the mentapaths or awarepaths. How doe we define mental identity between two awarepaducers? Is it possible to have mental identity between two awarepaducers?
Technical notes. Where and if this chapter should appear in the book.
The concept of mental identity my be a difficult one to fully understand, because we don't fully understand what the mind is let alone what mental identity is. Our mental identity is always changing. Our thoughts from one minute to the next are always changing. We have mood swings and desires to periodically sleep eat etc. People often make the statement "I am not the same nor do I feel the same after that happened to me", "that" being some kind of life experience. The different experiences that we have in our lives change us in many ways. Different experiences cause us to think and behave differently than we would have if we hadn't had them or had different ones in their place. Our mental identity is a mental identity of the here and now. But the here and now is always the past by the time that we are aware of it. We are only aware of our memories and experiences of our old self. This old self may be only a fraction of a second old but it is still not an instantaneous awareness of ourself. At least this is what science has found by studying the brain. Other theories about the mind say that the mind can be instantaneously aware of itself and because of that we can have at least one certain source of knowledge. The 16th century philosopher Rene Descartes after what he considered a through investigation of knowledge came up with the conclusion that because I think I exist, and on that he could be certain. But that only works if you can be certain that awareness of the mind as a whole is instantaneousness and unaffected by an external source. Other philosophers before and since have shown the flaws in this foundation of knowledge. If the brain produces the mind then we can not be certain of any of our thoughts as being true.
We will be learning what mental identity is for many years to come with increasing advancements in sciences's understanding of the brain and other computing devices. This theory covers some aspects of the consequences of the brain producing the mind. The brain produces the mind through its functioning. As the functioning of the brain changes so does the mind. There is substantial scientific evidence for this belief. What consequences of this information about the brain can be drawn? If science was advanced enough to run an experiment where two brains functioned in the exactly the same way for a period of time what would the corresponding minds have experienced? The identity theory of the mind would predict that the two minds would have experienced the same thing. The two brains would have produced the same thoughts, feelings, ideas, and all the other attributes that we attribute to the human mind. Remember that there is always the trivial production of nothing. Consequently, two brains that are not human may not produce any, or just some of the attributes of the human mind. But, the attributes that are human would be produced identically. If we did produce two human brains that functioned in the exact same way they would have the same mental attributes. If brain A thought that he was Jon Jones then brain "B" would produce the same though i.e., that he was Jon Jones. If brain "A" thought that the was eating a hot dog then brain "B" would think that the was eating a hot dog. Every thing that Brain "A" was aware of brain "B" would be aware of. But there would be more going on than that. All the subconscious things that was going on in brain "A" would be going on in brain "B". If there are more things that go on in a human mind other than conscious and unconscious things then they would correspondingly go on in the two brains "A" and "B".
What is an exact duplicate of a person? What is an exact duplicate of a particular human body? What is the difference between the two? Are they the same thing? What does it mean to have an exact copy of a human being? If we had an exact copy of a human being would it be the same person? An exact copy of a person would not be the same person but would have the same soul?
An exact duplicate of a human body would be a body that was the same as its duplicate in the flowing ways: there would be a one to one mapping of each atom from the original body to the duplicate body such that each atom would be in the same position relative to the other atoms in the body, the atoms would be in the same energy state and of the same elemental type along with any other physical properties unique to the atoms of the original body. This includes any chemical bonding that the original body has. An exact duplicate would look exactly like the original. An exact duplicate of the original body would have one other property that the original has that is through equal transformations the two bodies stay the same i.e., they stay exact duplicates. In other words, the original and duplicate bodies through time stay the same when their environment stay exactly the same.
Would an exact duplicate of a live human body be alive? By definition the exact duplicate would have to function in the same way as the original. Thus given the same external conditions the duplicate would have to behave in the same fashion as the original or a change would occur in the duplicate that did not occur in the original. Such as rotting.
What kind of a test can we set up for testing mental identity? We can have theoretical identity like in mathematics. Then there can be physical identity. Physical identity will be will be approximate within experimental bounds and theoretical identity will be identical within the definitions or axioms. In theoretical identity we deal with ideal objects so that we can compare there ideal qualities and see if they are identical. In this situation we may eliminate certain properties that we do not believe are tied to consciousness or affecting it we can also define consciousness as having certain properties. we may later find that there are other properties that we need to include in consciousness through experimentation.
Within the identity theory we can have theoretical tests for identity of paths such as "If these conditions are meet then the two path produce identical consciousness". These conditions may change between different types of itopaths. What might be an example of these conditions.? We can have many factors that go to effect the variety of paths these factors can be combined into a continuum so that the conditions might not be clearly defined and simple but there are always simplifying factors concepts processors etc. in every epistemological situation
The meta language might be fluid and not precise in a definition along with the definition. What I mean by fluid is that there is more that one way to do a thing or define a thing etc.
It would be nice to have a or many working definitions of identity of consciousness as it applies to ourselves subjectively or objectively as we look at different paths.
CHAPTER 4 MENTAL IDENTITY NOV 18 1986
B. Do we have a unique mental identity?
We have a tendency to think that we are unique. We believe that when we were made our mold was broken. With a little inspection of other peoples looks we find that some people do look alike. If we looked long enough we might find someone that looked like ourself. Identical twins don't have to look very far to find someone that looks like themselves. Identical twins look the same because they have the same genes. But if two people look the same are they really the same person? -- No. Identical looks does not imply that two people are the same. They will have had different experiences, emotions, etc. It would appear that all people on the earth have had different experiences consequently they must have a different mental identity. It seems possible that two different people that are brain dead but alive might by default have the same mental identity because they both have no mental identity which is the same. If there is no two people that have the same mental identity does that mean that it is impossible to have mental identity? Many people think so. So do many religions. Mental uniqueness is the basis for the concept of a unique soul. And a unique soul is the basis for reincarnation, life after death etc. Obviously, belief does not make fact. Unless we have checked every person that does or has or will exist for mental identity to every other person that has or will ever exist, we can not know that mental identity can not exist. But it only takes one example to show that it can exist. If we start with the premise that souls are unique, then we might be left with the belief that mental identity is also unique and impossible to have reproduced. But again we have no scientific way to study souls so we can not test the theory that souls are unique. We can only have faith in the belief that souls are unique but no proof of this belief.
===== put in soul chapter ?========
The Materialist conception of a soul --- according to the identity theory of the mind. What is a soul? It is the thing that makes one person different from another. It is the thing that perpetuates a person after death. It is the part of a person that is not material. Advantages of a materialist (scientific) theory of the soul over a religious theory of the soul.
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A proof of the identity theory. We change very little from one second to the next. Our minds change little from one second to the next. If the brain changes a little the mind changes a little. If we freeze the brain there is no mind if we start it up again in the same functioning fashion then there is again a mind produced If we take a section of the mind produced
If we take a person and compare the mind produced by the person from time a to time b and to that of the mind produced by the same person from time b to time c as t becomes smaller and smaller the minds produced become more and more identical or alike. Some minds will converge closely alike physical functioning can cause closely alike mental functioning. The mentality that I have one minute can be closely like the mentality that I have the next. I can also have drastic changes to both my body and my mind where my mind stops and the body continues. These are examples that close physical function produces mental functioning
limit as t approaches 0 t is time
We have good reason to believe that changes in the brain cause changes in the mind. We have reason to believe that the exact matter is not as important as the way the matter relates to and functions with the rest of the matter in the brain. We do not have the same matter in the body. Matter and energy is being replaced and removed from the body all the time. We have good reason to believe that no mind or consciousness is being produced when there is no change in the body. So change is essential for the body to produce the mind. We have good reason to believe that change in the mind can be smooth. This means that some of the change in the mind some of the present mind is going to be like the previous mind and some can be different. Is a mind that is radically different from one instant to the next a possibility. If the brain can produce a mind and small changes in the brain can produce small changes in the mind, then another brain that approximates the functioning of the first brain can approximates the mind produced in the first brain. If time is a dimension then the jump in the brain from one time to another will be like the jump to a different brain at the same functioning point.
If we consider a section of a mentapath produced by a physipath and If we take a physipath from point A to point B and compare to the same physipath from point B to point C A and A' B and B' We have two sections of a physipath from A to B and from A' to B'. Both sections by definition will produce a mentapath. We can have the limit of the section as A' approaches A and B approaches B'. The mentapath AB becomes identical to the mentapath A'B' So we have a situation where as two physipaths become closer and closer alike the mentapaths become closer and closer alike. (Limit argument)
Arguments for the identity theory
1. Simplicity argument. It is the simplest theory about consciousness etc. 2. Limit argument. 3. Dimensional argument change through time is same as change through space. Its not the dimension but the structural change that counts. 4. Its not the matter that counts but changes in matter that count. A particular piece of matter does not have to be there for a particular consciousness to exist.
Does a particular piece of matter have a unique on consciousness? The identity says no.