List of arguments for superimmortality 10

From ixperiencit
Jump to navigation Jump to search

List of arguments for superimmortality


First experiment argument: showing that a body can produce behavior, consciousness, and ixperiencitness. And that the same physapath is more likely to produce this behaviorpath awarepath and ixperiencitness again than a different ones.

Identical structure and functioning produces identical behavior argument:

Nearly identical structure and functioning produces identical behavior argument:


Behavior of a body gives information about the consciousness produced by a body argument:

Behavior of a body gives information about the conscious self produced by a body argument:

A repetition, restoration, replication of a physapath will produce the same awarepath and ixpepath or ixperiencitness argument:

The awarepath produced by a body gives information about the ixpepath produced by a body argument:

The ixpepath is part of or an aspect of the awarepath argument: the only necessary aspect of the ixperiencitness is that you experience the consciousness

Ixperiencitness continuum argument: The ixperiencitness produced by different bodies can be percentage wise identical


Progressive lateral argument: you experience change in the progressive way from a physapoint, then it seem that you will also experience change in the lateral or divergent way as well.

Multiple divergences with the same ixperiencitness from each awaremoment argument: There are a number of things that you can experience starting at each point in your life. You do not think that there is only one physapath or awarepath that you can experience.

Traveling to versions of yourself in time argument: showing that two or more bodies can produce the same ixperiencitness at the same time and even be aware of each other.


Continuum arguments for repetition: At what point in the change in variables do you not get repetition of consciousness? At what point in the change in variables do you not get repetition of ixperiencitness?

Continuum arguments for restoration: At what point in the change in variables do you not get restoration of consciousness? At what point in the change in variables do you not get restoration of ixperiencitness?

Continuum arguments for replication: At what point in the change in variables do you not get replication of consciousness? At what point in the change in variables do you not get replication of ixperiencitness ?


Where is the evidence for the counter hypothesis argument: There needs to be good reasons for the counter hypothesis that identical structure and functioning does not always or ever produce identical consciousness and ixperiencitness If it is accepted that identical or near identicla consciousness can potentially be produced there needs to be good reasons for the further counter hypothesis that identical structure and functioning does not always or ever produce identical ixperiencitness .


Simplicity argument: The concept of souls or other supernatural entities make a theory more complex. When there is no or reduced identity, when there is identity of structure and functioning and no identity of behavior consciousness and ixperiencitness


Occam razor argument: --superimmortality is more likely than mortalism or supernatural theories. One should choose the simpllist theory that predicts accurately the most.

Explanatory argument: Superimmortality explains a lot about consciousness, how it it produced, what is produced

Not supernatural argument: A scientific theory that is coherent with science as a whole with no supernatural concepts of entities

Predictive argument: The concept of souls or other supernatural entities make a theory more complex and almost impossible to predict Mortalist predict that there is no life after death thus the same ixperiencitness can never be produced again. Mortalist have to make a hypothesis that explains why identical or nearly identical structure and functioning even though it seems to produce identical consciousness and self does not produce identical ixperiencitness under any circumstance. Or why it only produces identity of ixperiencitness under certain circumstances that are not conditions of life after death

Ixperiencitness existence proof: You experience consciousness over variations in consciousness

Enhancement argument: Physapaths can be enhanced producing enhanced awarepaths and the same ixperiencitness


Multiplicity argument: There can be many different bodies producing the same or different consciousnesses with the same ixperiencitness at the same


Control over your future awarepaths argument: 

   1. Knowing how consciousness that you experience are produced 
   2. Knowing that there are many different awarepaths you can experience 
   3. Knowing that there are many enhanced awarepaths that you will experience
   4. Knowing that there can be many different awarepaths that have your ixperiencitness at one time
   5. Knowing that there can be a greater caring from different awarepaths that have the same ixperiencitness about which future awarepaths to produce 
   6. Knowing that environments, genes, etc., can be modified to make more desirable awarepaths
   7. With this and other knowledge there can be a great deal of control over the future awarepaths that will be created that you and other you care about will experience.


Increasing probability of life after death argument: What increases the probability of life after death if the principles of superimmortality are true: 

   1. No soul means that there does not have to be control over a specific soul that one can not control or even know about 
   2. No supernatural entities or concepts. they we can not be observed, controlled, predicted, explained, or understand
   3. No continuousness of body or consciousness is necessary for life after  death --- do not have to be physically continuous in the same body to produce the same ixperiencitness.  Consciousness or an awarepath does not have to be continuous to produce the same ixperiencitness 
   4. Continuity of matter or consciousness (memories, skills etc.,) is not necessary to produce the same ixperiencitness 
   5. Any matter that can produce one of the possible structures and functionings (physapath) will do to produce the desired ixperiencitness. Any matter when used in the right proportions can be used to make any ixperiencitness or ixpepath 
   6. Any different ixperiencitness can be produced at any place and time where the corresponding producing structure and functioning can occur.
   7. Identity of structure and functioning is not necessary to produce a specific awarepath or ixperiencitness. 
   8. Many different physipaths or physapaths will produce the same awarepath even more physipaths and physapaths will produce the same ixperiencitness
   9. Many different physapaths can exist at the same time producing the same ixperiencitness. Multiplicity of self throughout space and time
   10. Potential for the multiplicity of self  existing at one time increases the possibility of of your ixperiencitness being produced  
   11. Enhanced physapaths can produced enhanced awarepaths that can have the same ixperiencitness 
   12. Electronic physapaths could produce awarepaths with the same ixperiencitness.  
   13. Awarepaducers can exist producing many different neuropaths and awarepaths by producing externapaths that nature itself can not
   14. The universe has lot of matter, energy, and time to produce endless amount of physapaths producing the same ixperiencitness 
   15. Ixperiencitness is a continuum concept meaning that awarepaths can have percentage wise identity of ixperiencitness
   16. Awarepath can have knowledge about awarepaths. Physapath can have intention to produce positive and not negative awarepaths
   17. Apparently complete awarepaths can be produced by physasections of various lengths that are created throughout time and space using most matter. 
   18. No infinitely long singular continuous boring awarepath after death as religions predict/promise
   19. Actual experiences of actual events are not necessary to produce the same ixperiencitness
   20. The same memories are not necessary for producing he same ixperiencitness



Memory loss argument: If you loose some to all of your memories you do not necessarily loose or change the ixperiencitness. Amnesia does not cause the body to produce a different ixperiencitness.

Memory regain argument: Memories that have been lost in an awarepath can be regained without changing the ixperiencitness. The reversal of amnesia does not cause the body to produce a different ixperiencitness.


Memory replacement argument: Memories can be replaced in an awarepath without changing the ixperiencitness. Memories of events can be replaced in an awarepath without changing the ixperiencitness

Memory addition argument: Memories can be added to the awarepath without changing the ixperiencitness. Memories of events can be added to the awarepath without changing the ixperiencitness. Memories of events that did not actually occur to the body can be added to the awarepath without changing the ixperiencitness.


Actual experience argument: Your actual experiences do not determine your ixperiencitness. Actual experiences are sometimes used to determine if you are the same person but actual experiences do not effect the ixperiencitness because identity of ixperiencitness is determined by identity or neary identity of structure and functioning not how the structure and functioning was produced. If your structure and functioning was produced in a n experience machine and not by reality then the ixperiencitness would be the same If all of a sudden god or advanced scientist made your structure and functioning new with out these experience even though you have the same memories of these events.

Split and recombination argument of identical s&f bodies What happens when two bodies that have identical structure and functioning are split and recombined with half of each other. Thus there are two new bodies with identical structure and fuctioning. Reverse the process so you now have the original bodies

Analogies arguments: Analogy with television: Analogy with smartphones: Analogy with computers: Analogy with material objects in general:


Emergent properties argument for consciousness versus everything is at least a little conscious argument

Matter and energy have the able to produce consciousness when it has the right structure and functioning but it is not itself conscious.

Electrons have the ability to be part of making water but electrons are not themselves water A water molecule has the ability to be part of producing wetness but a singular water is not wet Water is part of a nerve cell but water is not a neuron. A neuron is part of a brain but a brain is not a neuron.


If an atom has % consciousness, if each of the percentage amount is added up does this equal a human consciousness The brain has to have the right structure and then function in the right way to produce consciousness. Putting the atoms in close proximity does not alone produce consciousness

If the original thinks that he is the original so will the cidentireplicas (argument)


If the original does not thing that the is the original neither will the cidentireplica (argument) It does not matter the truth for the individualo



One of the arguments that you are connected to your brain and only your brain is the fact that when something happens to the brain like a injury, your consciousness can radically change. But this is supporting evidence for the structure and functioning is producing the change to all brains that have identical structure and functioning. For example, the cidentireplica of the original that has the bad brain injury will show the same behavior as the original does. Every brain injury will produce a change in structure and functioning of the brain and the behavior and awareness of internal consciousness will be identical. The changes in the consciousness produced by a brain is dependent on the structure and functioning that the brain it is producing.


Lost and gain self and a new self argument The mortalist view is that between one moment and the next, when there is enough discontinuity, there is something lost about the original person and then something different gained in the continuing person.

There has to be a specific list of conditions that the self is permanently destroyed and a new self is created. Then a second set of conditions where the self is not destroyed. For instance, how much new matter can come into the body and how fast this new matter can come into the body. How about split and recombination over and over again with two or more bodies. How long can the body be dead before it is restored/ Can the whole body, except the brain or nervous system, be replaced and still be the same person? If a person can be an electronic continuation of a biological person how can this electronic body be modified before some other self replaces the original in this electronic body.

If there is only physical factors involved then what is lost and what is then gained again. What is lost in the concept of sameness of person. This is not the same person. This is not a statement about consciousness or ixperiencitness. If there are cases where there are no discrete dividing lines how do we deal with these cases ---- none discretely as a continuum how do you deal with the can where there is no clear distinctions between the selfs in the transitional experiments.

Retrieved from "https://volney.co/ixperiencit/index.php?title=List_of_arguments_for_superimmortality_10&oldid=1316"