Pain pleasure experiments for determining personal identity 2

File Pain pleasure experiments for determining personal identity 

Usually people want to avoid painful experiences and desire and work for pleasurable experiences. People have learned through life that to avoid pain and seek pleasure they have to treat the body in certain learned ways and not others. People as well as most conscious animals learn that when their bodies get hurt they suffer but when they see other bodies get hust they do not feel this pain. In the same way conscious animals do not enjoy the pleasure that other conscious bodies are feeling. Under what conditions do we experience pain?

This is an quote from Wikipedia under the topic of Personal identity:

What you think is the case may not make it the case what you think will feel the pain might not be who actually experience the pain. The particular structure and functioning of matter feels the pain.

"Bernard Williams presents a thought experiment appealing to the intuitions about what it is to be the same person in the future.[25] The thought experiment consists of two approaches to the same experiment. For the first approach Williams suggests that suppose that there is some process by which subjecting two persons to it can result in the two persons have "exchanged" bodies. The process has put into the body of person B the memories, behavioral dispositions, and psychological characteristics of the person who prior to undergoing the process belonged to person A; and conversely with person B. To show this one is to suppose that before undergoing the process person A and B are asked to which resulting person, A-Body-Person or B-Body-Person, they wish to receive a punishment and which a reward. Upon undergoing the process and receiving either the punishment or reward, it appears to that A-Body-Person expresses the memories of choosing who gets which treatment as if that person was person B; conversely with B-Body-Person. This sort of approach to the thought experiment appears to show that since the person who expresses the psychological characteristics of person A to be person A, then intuition is that psychological continuity is the criterion for personal identity. The second approach is to suppose that someone is told that one will have memories erased and then one will be tortured. Does one need to be afraid of being tortured? The intuition is that people will be afraid of being tortured, since it will still be one despite not having one's memories. Next, Williams asked one to consider several similar scenarios.[l] Intuition is that in all the scenarios one is to be afraid of being tortured, that it is still one's self despite having one's memories erased and receiving new memories. However, the last scenario is an identical scenario to the one in the first scenario.[m] In the first approach, intuition is to show that one's psychological continuity is the criterion for personal identity, but in second approach, intuition is that it is one's bodily continuity that is the criterion for personal identity. To resolve this conflict Williams feels one's intuition in the second approach is stronger and if he was given the choice of distributing a punishment and a reward he would want his body-person to receive the reward and the other body-person to receive the punishment, even if that other body-person has his memories.”

The problem with these scenarios is that there is no recognition of the importance of what is actually happening to the structure and functioning of the brain during this process. How much identity of ixperiencitness exists before the process happens and how much ixperiencitness identity exists after the process. According to superimmortality the two different bodies can have identical physapaths and identical ixperiencitnesses before the application ot pain to one and not to the other. The pain that one experiences will produce a difference in the structure and functioning and consequently the awarepath between the two bodies but the ixperiencitness can continue to be identical. But lets say the painful experience changes the structure and functioning so much that they no longer have identical ixperiencitnesses. There is a loss for this particular ixperiencitness grouping of consciousnesses

If body A has one ixperiencitness and body B has a different ixperiencitness and the ixperiencitnesses are exchanged by exchanging the structure and functioning then one should chose the body to receive the pain that does not have your ixperiencitness.

If body A is your consciousness presently being produced and body B is producing a consciousness that you experienced in the past, both with the same ixperiencitness you would want to still avoid the pain by choosing A, because the effect of the pain would be on this other version of you and the effect on the structure and functioning would not be effecting the current you. If you has further knowledge that this other person actually has your ixperiencitness at an earlier point in your life and you knew that, that kind of pain at that point in your previous life would cause this version of you to either commit suicide or be very psychologically messed up for the rest of your life, you might take the pain instead.

What if you had the option of both of you suffering pain but afterwords the changes to the structure and functioning was removed so that no awareness or bad side effects were ever known about. It would be like somebody telling you that you just suffered severe pain ten minutes ago, when in fact you have no evidence of this ever happening.

What if you had the choice of both having memories of suffering severe pain but in fact never did. What occurred was a change in the brains that were the same as if these painful events did happen.

You receiving the pain versus 10 cidentireplicas of you receiving the pain

You receiving the pain versus 10 people having a different consciousness but with the same ixperiencitness of you receiving the pain

You receiving the pain versus 10 identical physasections in the same body receiving the pain each time you will not be aware of the number of previous times

Switching the structure and functioning between two people

Your decisions on who will receive the pain will depend on how the brain functions given the different structures of the brain when given this choice

The difference between the psychological view, the body view, and the structure and functioning view

You are where the psychology is, you are where the body is, versus you are where the structure and functioning is.

No empathy no taking the pain for the other person because you are selfless

You and a cidentireplica

You consciously now and you consciously at a time in the future

You now and a versions of you in the future or past