Ch1 poss 6-end 14

File name ch1 poss 6-end File created date 01:35 pm Tuesday, October 31 2006 possible book name Mentaepistemology the science of conscious existence

second part of chapter 1

Approximation argument

Understanding approximation

If we remove fat from a person this will not effect consciousness as much as removing a much smaller amount of neurotransmitter between the neurons. If enough neurotransmitters are removed there will be no consciousness produced by the brain. Certain physical changes to the body make large changes to consciousness and others make no change at all. A science of conscious existence will determine which physical changes make which conscious changes. A small barrier between the neurons will also eliminate the brain ability to produce consciousness. As will simple change in the molecules of the neurotransmitters. The concept of approximation is determining the different factors that effect the body and them determining how changes in this factor changes consciousness. Certain changes will have little or no effect and others will have overwhelming. The changes in different factors can add to the effect on consciousness or cancel out the change. And changing factors can simply have different effects neither increasing or decreasing the effect of the other factors. The approximation argument counters two objections. First that we can never make an exact replica. There are many Approximations that are good enough to produce the exact same consciousness.

The sixth possibility The sixth possibility is where some parts of the consciousness of the cidentireplica are identical to that of the original’s and some are not. The cidentireplica in this situation is conscious like the original in some but not in all ways. In this case the cidentireplica has the original’s consciousness but it is out of sequence or parts are missing, added or different from the original’s. One example is that the cidentireplica has some of the memories identical to those of the original and some memories that are different. Another could be the cidentireplica has all the memories of the original but not another aspect of consciousness such as emotions. A more specific example would be the original is experiencing smelling the scent of a rose and the cidentireplica is experiencing smelling the scent of a carnation. If the sixth possibility is correct we have to ask ourselves and explain why is there this difference in certain aspects of the consciousness and not others? And the converse why is there some identity in the two consciousness? This possibility makes the study of consciousness much more complicated with the need for a much more complex theory. Every case where there is a difference or identity in consciousness would need to be explained and predicted individually along with their underlying causes which science has found no evidence of. (Complexity of theory argument) The Cid paradox applies here equally to this sixth possibility as to the fourth possibility. If we ask the original what he is smelling he will say a rose. Ask the cidentireplica the same question he will either say a rose and wonder why he said that producing a change in this brains functioning. Or he says carnation in which case he is obviously not a cidentireplica of the original. Within this sixth possibility there is the situation where the cid paradox exists i.e., the cidentireplica is aware that his behavior is different from what he thinks it should be yet is able to function for the duration with out problems. An example of this would be, I smell a rose and say it is my favorite smell of the types of flowers yet I know that it is not my favorite. It is so close to the smells that I like that it does not cause me to try to say that, or behave like. it is not my favorite.

We can consider the situation where the original sees red and has the sensation of red but the cidentireplica sees red but has the sensation of seeing blue. The cidentireplica could have learned (believed he had learned, if he was created as an adult) this sensation as red from the time he was a child so he sees no paradox in saying red when in fact he senses blue. Are there any unforseen consequences in this situation that would betray to him the fact that he sees colors differently than normal or other than the way the original sees them? He has learned that when you mix red with yellow you say orange. But what color does he sense? He might see orange (because that is the normally seen color) or green (because that is what you get when you mix yellow and blue). If there is an internal paradox he might have worked them out so the behavior is consistent with the mentality even though the mentality and behavior do seem to conflict. Another possible variation is where the cidentireplica could sense a whole other spectrum or reality of colors. So when the original sees red he senses not one of the other colors but a color that the original can not sense. In this situation we have mapped one reality to two different consciousness. This new consciousness can be entirely new, partially new, rotation of known conscious parameters, one to one replacement or a switch. A rotation would be like the rotation in the spectrum where the relationship of the colors is the same. In each case the relative functioning of the consciousness will stay the same. A cid paradox would not necessarily exist here.

Will the rotation cause a problem? Will a one to one replacement cause a problem? Consider the replacement of blue with red. The cidentireplica sees the color red, but he senses blue he has learned to say red when he sees blue. No contradiction until he mixes colors. Red mixed with yellow is called orange what does he see? He sees red as blue what does he see yellow as? If he sees yellow as yellow then he will be matching yellow with what appears to be blue to him. What does he sense then. Green or orange? In these situations where consciousness is different but there is no cid paradox we have to explain why there is a unique consciousness that completely fits into his sense of reality and behavior. Obviously again making for a much more complex theory of consciousness.

When we consider color we start with photons hitting cones in the retina of the eye and stimulating them. The red photons will stimulate the cones in the cidentireplica in exactly the same way as in the original by definition. If we trace the paths of the stimulation through the neurons from those cones it will be exactly like the paths of stimulation of the original. Finally, it gets to the parts of the brain that produce speech and generates the neuronal impulses that go to the muscles that produce the sound “red”. The red photons actually produced the result of the original and cidentireplica “saying red” by way of the structure and functioning of body. If the cidentireplica experienced blue where was this experience created? The experience would have to be created some where with in the same structure and functioning that produced the experience of red but not produce the experience of red in the cidentireplica. If both the experience of red and blue were created in the cidentireplica we have the problem of how it produced not only one but both. There would be no necessary connection between brain functioning and consciousness. There would be no reason to think that in another situation of identical functioning for the original (a different cidentireplica) will see blue also instead of red.

Pain and feelings that correspond to specific behavior would not be as interchangeable as color because if pain felt good to the cidentireplica, he would be giving the impression of being happy when he says that he is in pain. He could even say that he wished that he was in pain or that he liked pain etc. If the pain was replaced with a new kind of consciousness that created the exact same behavior it could not be a pain that could be described differently as a stabbing pain or throbbing pain because this could lead to the cidentireplica describing it differently. His behavior can not be different from the originals, being a cidentireplica, so there again is the cid paradox. There is not just the cid paradox with behavior that has to be dealt with, there is the situation where within the cidentireplica there is the conflict of mentality. In this situation one part of the mind of the cidentireplica will have certain thoughts and the other part corresponding to the originals will have thoughts that do not correspond or fit. Imagine the situation where the cidentireplica smells a rose and says it is his favorite because it is the originals favorite but it is in fact not the cidentireplica’s favorite. He starts thinking that it is strange that he said that but while he is thinking about this all around these thoughts will be at least some thoughts identical to those of the original’s. Remember that the brain /body is still functioning identically to the original. And in this sixth possibility they share many thoughts that are the same. So the cidentireplica will have thoughts that are different from the originals plus thoughts that are the same tied up together in a possibly illogical fashion. Normally if the cidentireplicas thoughts are illogical, it’s mentality is going to be diverging from the original more and more until its behavior becomes irrational in relation to his environment and its no longer a cidentireplica. A specific example of this is; The original and the cidentireplica are experiencing watching a football game. The original is eating chips but the cidentireplica is having different feelings and thoughts and does not want to be eating chips and decides not to eat them. But the original does and continues to do so. The cidentireplica functioning identically will be continuing to eat the chips. The cidentireplica will feel like a puppet unable to control his body. He goes into this uncontrollable desire to get up but he can not, He wants to do something different than he is doing. Since he is still having some consciousness like the original he feels very happy because his team just made a touch down. Then this strong desire to get more food. But because he can not control his body he feels like he has been buried alive in a coffin. It does not make sense to him how can he be happy, hungry and crazed with fear all at the same time. He sees his behavior being so calm yet his mind is out of control with bizarre sequences of thoughts and feelings. Because the cidentireplica can have a memory of thinking about this issue and the original will not, the cidentireplica and original will generate different memories. If my body did not behave like I thought it should, I could get mad even to the point of rage. This certainly can be different from what the original feels because he would not be mad because his body and his ability to control it would be functioning normally. What starts out as small differences in mentality can avalanche into large differences in mentality. When there is a large difference in mentality produced by brains we can see these differences in the way the brain functions. For instance, there are observable differences between the functioning of different brains that are upset and mad, and brains that are relaxing. Of course the nervous systems will be functioning identically by definition. So there will be one functioning structure and two different consciousness produced. If we consider more cidentireplicas of the original we might have a different consciousness for every new cidentireplica.

We have the ability to talk to ourselves internally. We can ask ourselves questions. And get answers with out ever saying anything, ever, out loud. If a difference in the original and cidentireplica internal conversation exists there will be feelings and behavior and even words within the conversation that could be totally mixed up. The cidentireplica might be having an internal conversation about how weird his body is behaving. While the original is watching TV, having an internal conversation about a football game. The two conversations put together could come out like this “Catch the darn ball havior is weird !”. From the two potential sentences “Catch the darn ball!” and “My behavior is weird!” You may not even be able to create your own internal conversation. It is all the originals internal conversation. You feel that something is wrong but the mental conversation is all about the football game. You mentally want to have an internal conversation about the weird things that are happening to you but all that is happening is the mental conversation about the football game. You can’t control your behavior and now you can’t control your internal thoughts. There would be all this weird internal variance in consciousness and yet no difference in behavior, structure, or functioning of the bodies. There would be no reason, or cause that is perceptible for this difference. No way of knowing about this difference externally. The cidentireplica could not report on the weirdness unless the original was doing the same because of identical behavior. If we accept the possibility of a consciousness that is totally different than the originals but totally in synchronization with its environment, so no cid paradox exists, there would be no way of knowing about this particular new consciousness rather than any other possible consciousness. If this dichotomy of thoughts, memories, feelings, emotions, etc. can happen to a cidentireplica who is exactly like the original except in a different position and or time and made of different but identical material, then it seems like it should or could happen to any naturally occurring person or original as well for the same reasons as it does for the cidentireplica. We can actually do experiments and simple ask people do these things happen to you? I personally do not experience these types of experiences. You also have to explain why this happens just because a person is a cidentireplicas of another. Since an original is a cidentireplica of its cidentireplicas why is this not happening to the original as well?

The seventh possibility is that the cidentireplica has all the mental attributes of the original but they are different in some ways like in degrees. The consciousness of the cidentireplica is close to that of the original’s consciousness and stays close to that of the original’s but not identical. An example would be when you were smelling a rose the cidentireplica has the consciousness identical to the original as if he had been smelling a rose but less intensely. Another example would be the original remembers his grandmother’s eyes being blue. But the cidentireplica remembers them being brown. This item might never be an issue that effects consciousness. This could also avalanche into a major issue if the cidentireplica finds out that there is a difference in his memory and reality. But if it does avalanche it is not in this possibility. In this case, by definition, the cidentireplica will never and can never be aware of a difference in behavior and his inner feelings, motivations, and desires -- consciousness. So the Cid paradox will never apply. We can in fact define the difference between the seventh possibility and fourth, fifth, and sixth as where the cidentireplica is conscious but the Cid paradox does not apply because the consciousnesses are so closely alike. If at some level there is not a material difference in their functionings and no other cause for their differences, we would still have a cidentireplica who’s consciousness is so close to the original’s consciousness that the original would consider it a version of his own consciousness. As with the other three previous possibilities this leads to a more complicated theory because we have to explain and predict why there are differences but close similarities in the consciousnesses. Any time we have to explain why identical functioning does not produce identical conscious we have to add complexity to a theory. This in itself is not bad if the complexity adds to our understanding and predictive ability. But, unlike the fourth, fifth, and sixth possibility it might make the subjective scientific understanding of consciousness from the inside an impossibility. There is no external objective difference that we can use to explain the difference in consciousness and no subjective internal difference that the individual can determine. However, Scientific approximation might be possible. Scientific approximation might be able to put bounds on what the extent to the differences are between the consciousness of the original and cidentireplica. But only if there is some measurable factors that control these differences even if they are only subjective measurements. In this case the cidentireplica and original would not be aware of a difference between the two consciousnesses in any kind of subjective experiment. And obviously, there will be no objective difference either. So a scientists studying his own cidentireplica could not discern any subjective difference between himself and his cidentireplica. We could also look at this case as being one where there is a difference but the consciousness produced would still be considered the originals consciousness but a slight variation of it. Variations of the original and cidentireplica will be covered in the chapters about videntireplicas. (Slight variation is good enough argument) If this consciousness was created in the original rather than the in the cidentireplica it would be considered just a variation of the originals consciousness. Which can be considered as good as the original (variation argument)

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If we look at the simple condition of I think that my grand mothers eyes are brown and my cidentireplica thinks that they are blue. And we ask the question what color are your grandmother eyes then trace back through the paths that the answer was generated we will find that the cidentireplica says blue and the original says brown the sound is generate by way of the vocal cords that are formed by certain muscles that are controlled by the nerves. These nerves go into the brain where the brain forms words from thoughts generated from the rest of the brain. The thought of having different colored eyes has to be generated by a difference in the functioning of the brain some where.

Identical functioning approximates a consciousness a fuzzy logic sort of identity of consciousness. Since there are many different changes we can make to the functioning of a cidentireplicas and many cidentireplicas we can have

Eight possibility: epistemological transposition with coherent behavior (other coherent conscious realities) Epitransformantional Epitransformantion is an epistemological transformation which is is a change in the knowledge about a reality.

Inverse transpose transposed transposition metathetical metathetic epistemological metathesis Epistemological transformation

The eight possibility may be difficult to understand. In this situation there is no cid paradox because the cidentireplica creates a conscious reality that fits the originals environment, functioning of the neurons, and its responses and behavior, perfectly like the original, but produces a different consciousness that believes that it is interacting with /reacting to a different reality. The cidentireplica consciousness in this possibility is just as in tune with it’s reality as the original’s consciousness is, but the cidentireplica produces a consciousness that is entirely different than the originals. The cidentireplica’s behavior is consistent like the original’s behavior is. What we have is a correct sequence of behavior that corresponds to the sense experiences of the original that seems to be consistent with this different consciousness. A very simple analogy might be the picture that you see in psychology books of a black and white picture where if you look at it one time it looks like a vase and you look at it again it looks like two faces looking at each other. The vase and the faces make visual concepts that are the inverse of each other. But correspond to very different ideas. However, when this specific case happens and every other one that has been studied the brain functions differently in producing these two consciousness, so this is really not an actual example. We have no scientific proof that inverse/ transposed conscious realities exist within or stemming from as a unit the same physical structure and functioning. But this does not mean that they could not exist. And this is why I bring it up here. This case is a lot like studying and explaining “smogles”(a word for an imaginary or non existent object) before we know that “smogles”do actually exist. We can outline the properties of this type of consciousness. The two consciousness produced will have a specific relationship that is tied together by behavior, input from the senses, structure and functioning of the brain. To keep from producing a cid paradox, there seems like there could be only a very limited amount of possibilities for this type of consciousness. (Transpositions limits arguments) Of course, there may be a whole other world of possible consciousnesses that fit these conditions. But why would this situation not apply to the originals as well? If it does then the world could be full of people with extremely bizarre consciousnesses in a different epistemological reality but seeming to fit well into this reality with their behavior and when their bodies are studied scientifically they are normal. If the original has this kind of consciousness and the cidentireplica also has this kind of consciousness then we still have identity of consciousness. (Identity of transpositional consciousnesses argument) It might be easiest to imagine this as an imaginary or illusionary consciousness in a reality that is not anything like our reality. The cidentireplica will behave like the original in every way but when he says apple he does not mean apple. He does not think apple. It has an entirely different meaning to his consciousness. When he moves his arm to open a door, in his conscious reality, it will be a different event like kicking a ball or saying a word like goodbye, listening to his heart beat, or even a conscious event beyond our comprehension. The consciousness of this different reality would be tied together into a workable whole similar to the unity of the original’s consciousness -- but a different epistemological, but non psychotic, reality. All parts or every aspect of this second or cidentireplica’s consciousness will have to fit together seamlessly or at least as well as it does in the originals consciousness. Nearly all or every different mental aspect will have a different meaning in order for it all to fit together. These facts will or would seem to limit how many different consciousnesses can be produced in this category. So if you make enough cidentireplicas you will eventually have ones that have identical consciousness as the original or another cidentireplica.(pigeon hole argument) If this happens will there be a reason for it? In other words is there a difference? If so they are not cidentireplicas. How can some have identical consciousnesses and some not and there be no physical difference? Subjectively it is very difficult to construct a consciousness like this that is understandable to our consciousness. When you are watching TV what you watch will have a different meaning and reality to -- your cidentireplica. When you pick up the glass of water it will have a different meaning than getting a drink. Every thing will have a different meaning but fit together in an consistent, coherent, non contradictory consciousness. Different words will not work because they require a different vocalization thus a different behavior of the neurons. The sounds coming out of the cidentireplica will have to be the same all the behavior will have to be the same by definition of cidentireplica. This transposed reality my not be understandable to our consciousness. To understand why this might be so difficult to produce we look at the scientific understanding of the consciousness. If this consciousness were to understand itself and its behavior it would have to have reasons or connections between what it does and for instance in the original reality getting a drink has a scientific reason we need water in our diet to survive. Getting a drink in this consciousness will not be getting a drink. It will be another weird conscious experience. So it will not be able to use the reason that we need water for survival. Needs may be converted into some other experience. There may not be the concept of needs for survival. The concepts of emotions, feelings, needs, etc, may have no meaning in this reality. Scientific concepts such a quantity, mass, energy, size, may not have meaning either. What’s more if there is the effort to understand reality because there is not the same relation to events as there is in our reality there may be no way to understand in any kind of scientific way. This may revert back to not having any kind of predictive ability. You have to have regularity to have predictive ability. Regularity for short periods of time might be possible but for any extended time it may not be. This is in many ways equivalent to having a tv set that works very well and reliably. An exact copy of this tv set is made, and this new copy when turned on to any channel no longer produces the show that is being broadcast but a coherent show that is entirely different from what the original creates on the same channel.

Summary of the problems with this possibility Problems with the eight possibility

This type of conscious reality has to be consistent with the functioning and structure of the original body and the physical laws that controls it.

1. No proof of their existence. They may not even exist. If they do there may only be a very few of them. May not be possible at all May not be possible with most originals and or cidentireplicas. May not be possible most of the time for any specific cidentireplica.

2. These epitransformational consciousness make understanding consciousness much more complex. 3. Why is not the original producing this consciousness in the first place? If the original is producing this epitransformantional consciousness, and the original consciousness at the same time, why doesn’t the cidentireplica produce both consciousnesses at the same time as well?

4. They are so complicated that one is not likely to exist for more than a few originals. Or for a limited amount of time for the cidentireplica. --( Difficulty of construction argument). 5. We still need to know why one will exist. We have to explain why the other possibilities do not apply.

6. Since it seems that there will only be a limited amount of these types, if we make more cidentireplicas of the original they will either have the consciousness of the original or that of the inverse consciousness.

7. When we consider close versions or variations of the original and close versions of the original behavior, it becomes very difficult to continue this inverse mapping because it is not a simple inverse any more. Where we might be able to create an inverse consciousness for an exact cidentireplica, when we make certain changes in the original and the corresponding changes in cidentireplica it will become impossible to keep these new Since the environmental sensepath can be very divergent there is a sensepath continuum that can be applied to the individual if each different sensepath will have to effect the physipath in different ways. This means that unless there are cid paradoxes there has to be a whole awarecontinuum of potential awarepaths for this possibility to exist. Which is even less likely than just one existing that perfectly fits this universe of sensepaths.

8. They may not even be understandable to us

9. We loose the ability to map from structure and functioning to consciousness.

It seems that if this consciousness deals with our epistemological reality, the longer that a pidentireplica exists the harder it would be for it to fit together with out producing a psychotic or cid paradox. An example of this would be

Makes a more complicated theory Have to explain why would this be happening with out a difference in the functioning and structure of the brain/ body? And why it only happens to the cidentireplica If it only happens to the cidentireplica Science may still be possible if a way to tell the difference exists If there is not a way to tell the difference but there is still sometimes the identity of consciousness The case of the idoriginals and the multiple cidentireplicas. the case of other naturally occurring identical original -- idoriginals the multiple cidentireplicas argument Multiple epistemological realities versus multiple cidentireplicas. the multiple cidentireplicas argument works because we can imagine any number of possible cidentireplicas or idoriginals if there are a certain amount of realities and there are more than this amount of idoriginals and cidentireplicas at least one will be identical. Can the itosciences deal with only identity of consciousness once and a while? If there is a reason for this difference there is not problem we can then predict. If There is no reason for this you can then only give a probability of identity between the original idoriginal and cidentireplica. This is still scientific -- consider QM.

Epitransformantional Epitransformantion is an epistemological transformation which is is a change in the knowledge about a reality.

Multiple cidentireplica proof hits hard on this possibility. If it is hard to create one of these types of consciousness for a cidentireplica what happens when we produce many cidentireplicas of one original. The first cidentireplica has this epitransformed consciousness what does the second one have? It either has the consciousness of the original, the first cidentireplica epitransformed consciousness or a new epitransformed consciousness. Since the first cidentireplica is an original to the second the second cidentireplica has to have a epitransformed consciousness to each that of the first cidentireplica there has to be a new epitransformed consciousness. Since there could be any number of cidentireplicas or idoriginals of the original there would have to be any number of these epitransformed consciousness. Since it was hard to create such a consciousness to begin with it will be almost impossible to create or have the potential for existence an endless amount

Multiple divergence proof there are many coriginals that have consciousnesses like the original what will be the consciousness of the cidentireplicas of these be. Not only will we have to have a epitransformed consciousness we have to have because of slight variations in cidentireplicas we have to have complete epitransformed coherent continuum of consciousness.

We have to ask if these inverse consciousness exists for every possible different original or just for a few. What happens to the ones that do not have the inverse consciousness?

Maybe a breaking down of parts of functioning that correspond to specific areas of consciousness

There are two parts to the argument against the eight possibility first where we look at the total set of consciousness and the total set of physical structures and functionings that apply there may be some that will fit but for all of the possible cidentireplicas of all the possible originals there is not apt to be enough transformed consciousnesses to go around. If there are not enough to go around this brings to the second possibility. What is the proof that there can not be very many of these coherent inverse consciousnesses. This need to be proved or supported for this argument

We have to ask why the original does not produce that inverse epistemological consciousness as well. Explain why and predict where they will exist. Second there are not enough consciousness to go around if we have inverse consciousness also mapping to cidentireplicas eventually there will be a copy of the consciousness -- the multicid argument. We can also consider more than one cidentireplica We can ask does every consciousness have an inverse consciousness that fits the environment with out a cid paradox? It is a different epistemological reality but it makes sense to the consciousness of this cidentireplica at least in terms of his reality. Although this is a possibility it is an abstract possibility that allows many possibilities into consciousness that we my not wish for.

Could a cid paradox be part of his reality? No by definition. Yes a cid paradox can apply to any coherent non crazy consciousness. A non resolved cid paradox in this situation produces a crazy consciousness.

His reality is a cid paradox where he is the observer of another persons life. Like we observe another person life in a movie. But here all the senses are tied to this other life not just a movie screen with picture and sound. We might consider this to be putting on an wearing some one else's life and you are the observer.

There is also all the modifications to this inverse consciousness that can be applied to the identical consciousness in the other possibilities B is behavior C is functioning M is mentality or consciousness

Why might this not be likely? Again this makes for a more complex theory because we have to explain why there is the difference in consciousness and why it is exactly this consciousness. will be limited the consciousness produced will have to be consistent with the behavior of every aspect of the functioning. It may be possible that only a few very rare consciousness could do this What is put out as behavior is also effecting the cidentireplica so the behavior has to make sense to this cidentireplica. What if it is just a crazy cidentireplica the behavior will not show any craziness if the original is not showing craziness. The crazy consciousness will be have to produce normal behavior and normal functioning of the neurons to us because there is no cid paradox here.

This is a case where the crazy consciousness never produces crazy behavior or abnormal or divergent from that of the original This crazy consciousness fit in perfectly. In this other reality the first group are consciousness that are normal in this reality but there also could be crazy consciousness as well

There would be a great deal of complexity in understanding a pidentireplica. They may not even exist. If they do they may only be able to exist for a short amount of time and then revert to another conscious version or possibility.

What keeps it that particular inverse parallel consciousness and not another version? Why that particular epistemological reality and not any other.

This possibility again makes for a much more complicated theory that could be dealt with scientifically but there still needs to be some difference in the cidentireplica and the pidentireplica that explains why they produce such different consciousness.

Cause and effect argument This happens for no reason. Versus There is something that causes it. If this type of bizarreness is happening, we can look for reasons why it happens. Through looking for reasons for why things happen in the ways that they do science finds reasons for why and how things happen. If these things do happen science can find out why they do happen and predict what consciousness will be produced under what circumstances. This means that the conditions that produced these consciousness were not identical so that with the correct conditions identity of consciousness again can be created. Science is all about finding the cause and effect of the phenomena's that we experience in life.

The ninth possibility (the combination possibilities) is the combination of any or all of the possible above cases in any sequence and degree.

This possibility could mean many different things: A few examples are

1. The first case is that each different cidentireplica will react with a different possibility to the original. Example: Every cidentireplica of an original will produce no consciousness. This is a result of possibility two. Where as the second cidentireplica or idoriginal of the original will have exactly the same consciousness possibility #1. The third cidentireplica will have the crazy consciousness possibility #5.

2. The second case is where each unique original / cidentireplica pairing uses a different possibility. An example: the cidentireplica of you produces no consciousness. The cidentireplica of your mother corresponds to possibility #3; a radically different consciousness than your mother’s. The cidentireplica of your father correspond to consciousness possibility #1 -- it has exactly the same consciousness as the original.

3. A third case is parts of each possibility is used in each original/ cidentireplica relationship. For instance, part of the time there is no consciousness produced by the cidentireplica (possibility #2), part of the time the consciousness produced by the cidentireplica is very close to that of the original (possibility #6), and part of the time it is crazy consciousness (possibility #5).

In this ninth possibility the first possibility does or can happen. So sometimes the cidentireplica will have an identical consciousness to that of the original. All the above arguments against the previous eight possibilities apply to this ninth possibility. What the ninth argument adds is more incomprehensible complexity. Something is incomprehensible if there is no understandable reason for it happening the way it does, and no way to predict how it will behave. You do not know why, how, when, or what consciousness will show up where. In this ninth possibility we not only have to scientifically explain why each of the previous seven possibilities exist but why and how all of them exist in the different patterns they exist in. We are getting farther and farther away from simplicity and scientific understanding with no good reason for it. We only know that nature can produce one consciousness under these specific conditions and that is the one it in fact does produce: the originals. By looking at individuals other than the original, we know in order to produce the consciousness that they are experiencing we have to have a different structure and functioning. So to say that any of the other possibility is possible is counter to what we know. We can extrapolate this to say that only specific structures and functionings will produce a specific consciousnesses. To predict other wise we need extra proof.

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Not needed in chapter 1 part 2

the different theories in the science of conscious existence

The identireplica theory of consciousness existence: The multiple theory of consciousness existence:

The continuum theory of consciousness existence: The potential Physipaths combined make a continuums 2. The potential Awarepaths combined make a continuum

Physicontinuum awarecontinuum mapping theory. Physicontinuum and awarecontinuums can be constructed so they map to each other

The Videntireplica theory of consciousness existence: that versions of you have the same ixperiencit or pass the ixperiencit test.

The Fidentireplica theory of consciousness existence: 1. that fidentireplicas can produce consciousnesses. 2.

The Enhancement theory of consciousness existence: that awarepaths can be enhanced by enhancing the physipath and it will continue to have the same ixperiencit

The transformational theory of consciousness existence: biological systems are not the only ones that can be conscious