Mental properties continuation arguments
Mental properties continuation arguments are supporting arguments for some of awaretheory conjectures and predictions. There arguments are based on other assumptions that are included and used here but are dealt with in other ways through other arguments.
It has been argued by some thinkers that a life after death situation will have to contain the up to date memories, personality, etc., of you, to be a continuation of you after your bodies death. Awaretheory argues that this is not necessary. These following arguments are supporting reasons showing that specific memories, personalities traits, skills and abilities, etc., are not necessary conditions for a continuation of your ixperiencitness after death. Each of these arguments follow the same format; connect your ixperiencitness to different times in your life when these characteristics were different, showing that your ixperiencitness is not restricted to a specific end of life set of characteristics.
Memory continuation argument is that there does not have to be a continuation of the same memories that one has at death for a continuation of the same ixperiencitness in later or previous existing consciousnesses or awarepaths. The supporting argument for this prediction is that the awarepath that represents your current life extend into the past and into the future. At least part of this awarepath will have your ixperiencitness. But previous parts of the awarepath will not have the currently being produced memories. If you duplicate these past structures and functionings of matter that produced your ixperiencitness after your death you will be experiencing these past experiences again now. Thus it is possible that conscious versions of you that exist after death can have memories different than you had at or right before conscious death.
Personality continuation argument is that there does not have to be a continuation of the same personality traits that one has at death for a continuation of the same ixperiencitness in later or previous existing consciousnesses or awarepaths. The supporting argument for this prediction is that the awarepath that represents your current life extend into the past and into the future. At least part of this awarepath will have your ixperiencitness. But previous parts of the awarepath with your ixperiencitness will not have some or all of the currently being produced personality traits. If you duplicate these past structures and functionings of matter that produced your ixperiencitness after your death you will having different personality traits now. Thus it is possible that conscious versions of you that exist after death can have personality traits different than you had at or right before conscious death.
One of the consequences of this is that you might not have to have all of the bad personality traits or personality traits you dislike in future version of your self
Abilities continuation argument
You do not have to have the same abilities
You do not have to have the same emotions toward people and other topics that you did before you died
Environmental continuation argument
Your environment does not have to be the same
Body looks continuation argument
You do not have to have the same body type and looks that you did before you died. Your body can even look none human.
See also: Template: Physical properties continuation arguments, Physical properties continuation arguments
