Chapter 16
The Test For Originalness
Here is one more thought experiment that reveals the deep implications of our theory.
Imagine that "all-knowing" experimenters (scientists with perfect knowledge of physics and unlimited technological capability) create several cidentireplicas of you. They now have, let's say, five bodies in a room: the original you and four cidentireplicas. All five have identical structure and functioning, behave identically, and claim to be the original. Each one has memories of being the original. Every one of them believes, sincerely and with full conviction, that they are the "real" one.
The experimenters know the complete physical history of all five bodies — they know which one has been continuously existing since birth and which four were recently created. But here is the challenge: can they determine which is the original without consulting that historical record?
What This Tells Us
The test for originalness reveals something important: being the "original" confers no special status in terms of conscious experience.
The original and the cidentireplicas all have the same ixperiencitness. They all have the same memories. They all have the same sense of being "themselves." The only difference between them is their history — which specific atoms were used, how long the body has been in existence, where it has been. And none of these historical facts affect the present conscious experience.
The same applies to bodies and consciousness. The "original" body is not the "real" you. It is just the oldest instance. All instances that produce your ixperiencitness are equally "you."
And this means that if the original body dies while the cidentireplicas continue, you have not died. You have lost one instance, but the others continue. Your ixperiencitness is still being produced. You are still alive — in every sense that matters.
The Deeper Lesson
The test for originalness reveals something that goes beyond the debate about replicas. It reveals that the concept of "originalness," which feels so fundamental to our sense of identity, has no physical basis. It is a label we attach to things, not a property things have.
This matters because the fear of death is, at its core, a fear about the loss of originalness. "When I die, the original me is gone." But if originalness is not a physical property, if it cannot be detected, measured, or even defined in terms of the present state of a body, then it cannot be the thing that makes your consciousness yours. And if it is not what makes your consciousness yours, then losing it (in death) does not mean losing your consciousness.
What makes your consciousness yours is ixperiencitness, and ixperiencitness, unlike originalness, is a property of the present physical state. It can, in principle, be measured (once we develop the right instruments). And it can be reproduced.
Key Terms in This Chapter
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The remaining text (examples, counter-arguments, and longer connective passages) is in the book.