Chapter 3
Why Your Intuitions Are Wrong
There is a powerful argument against everything I have just said, and it goes like this: "That can't be right. It just doesn't feel right. I know I am this body, this brain, these atoms. A copy of me would not be me, no matter how perfect. It's obvious."
This is what philosophers call the argument from intuition. And it is perhaps the most common reason people reject the ideas in this book without actually engaging with the logic.
So let me explain why your intuitions about consciousness and identity are almost certainly wrong, and why trusting them on this topic is about as wise as trusting your gut feeling that the Earth is flat.
The Copernican Lesson
There was a time when the most obvious fact in the world was that the sun moved across the sky. You could see it with your own eyes. It rose in the east, traveled in an arc overhead, and set in the west. The Earth was clearly stationary (you couldn't feel it moving) and the sun clearly orbited around it.
This "obvious" fact was wrong. The Earth rotates on its axis and orbits the sun. But the truth was so contrary to everyday experience that it took centuries of scientific investigation, mathematical proof, and bitter controversy before it was widely accepted.
The lesson of the Copernican Revolution extends far beyond astronomy. It is about the reliability of human intuition when it comes to questions that go beyond everyday experience.
But useful for survival is not the same as true. The sense that the sun orbits the Earth was useful too; it helped our ancestors predict the seasons and navigate by the stars. That didn't make it true.
The Folk Psychology Trap
Psychologists have a term for the set of intuitive beliefs we all have about how the mind works: folk psychology. Folk psychology includes beliefs like "I am a single self," "my consciousness is continuous," "I am tied to this specific body," and "a copy of me would not really be me."
These beliefs feel self-evident. They feel like they must be true because of how obvious they seem. But this feeling of obviousness is exactly what should make us suspicious.
• "We see the world as it really is." Wrong. Our visual system constructs a model of the world based on limited sensory data, filling in gaps, correcting for distortions, and even fabricating details. Visual illusions prove this conclusively. The world you see is not the world as it is; it is a construct of your brain.
In each case, the folk-psychology belief felt obviously true. And in each case, it was wrong. Why should we expect our folk-psychology beliefs about identity and consciousness to be any different?
The "It's Not Me" Argument
The most common folk-psychology objection to the ideas in this book is what I call the "It's Not Me" argument. It goes like this: "Even if you built a perfect replica of my brain, made of different atoms, in a different place, it would not be me. It would be a copy. I would still be here, in this body. The copy might think it's me, but it would be wrong."
This argument feels compelling. But let's examine what it actually claims.
The "It's Not Me" argument asserts that there is something about your specific body, something beyond its structure and functioning, that makes your consciousness yours. It asserts that even if two brains are physically identical in every measurable way, they could produce different conscious experiences, because one of them is the "original" and the other is a "copy."
The answer, obviously, is no. Your consciousness is determined by the present structure and functioning of your brain, not by the history of the atoms that make it up. History matters only insofar as it shapes the present physical state. If the present physical state is the same, the consciousness is the same, regardless of how that state was achieved.
How to Think Clearly About Identity
So if our intuitions are unreliable, how should we think about identity?
The answer is: by following the evidence, even when it leads somewhere uncomfortable.
Here is a simple method. When you find yourself thinking "but that's not really me," ask yourself: What experiment could I perform to test this claim? What observable, measurable, physical property would distinguish the "real me" from the "not really me"?
Your intuitions about identity were built for the savanna, not for the truth. Once you let go of them, the path from the three premises to their conclusion becomes very difficult to block.
Key Terms in This Chapter
Read the rest of this chapter
The remaining text (examples, counter-arguments, and longer connective passages) is in the book.