Idoriginal paradox
An idoriginal is closer to an original than a cidentireplica because unlike a cidentireplica that only has to have the same physapath starting at the required physapoint as the original it also has to have the same externapath, during its creation, to some defined degree from identical to partially identical. As a result, It should be that the idoriginal is more likely to have the original's ixperiencitness and awarepath than a cidentireplica.This is because many people believe that for the original to be consciously unique requires unique experiences that the idoriginal has but that the cidentireplica does not have to have.
The idoriginal having the same physapath as the original has also the same behaviorpath as does the original. The ixperiencit theory of consciousness predicts that there are many different but closely alike awarepaths that will never notice that their body's behavior is not at all but slightly different from what they think it should behave. If it is true, like many people believe, that identical physapaths do not produce identical awarepaths every idoriginal will have a different awarepath from the original and from each other. If what the idoriginal consciously wants is different from what the behaviorpath of the original provides the idoriginal can notice this difference. The more he notices the difference in what his body does and what he wants the body to do the more divergent his awarepath becomes from that of the original's awarepath or consciousness. It soon becomes apparent to the idoriginal that he is not controlling his body, but the physical evidence is this brain and neurons that are part of his body are controlling his body. At this point it would appear that the brain is no longer producing the consciousness, or that the brain is producing two very different consciousnesses. It seems strange that the simple production of a idoriginal would split the mind from the brain, or start to produce two different consciousnesses. In both cases what is the scientific explanation for these divergent occurrences of consciousnesses and how can you ever predict what these new consciousnesses will be like.
You could be idoriginal of some previously existing original, can you control your body?
If there is no awareness within the awarepath that there is a difference in conscious desire and behavior of the body then in most cases the consciousness produced by the identical physapaths will be very similar. If the awarepaths are very similar they likely have the same ixperiencitness. In this case they are conscious versions of you that you experience, not some unique different consciousness.
See also: Original paradox, Idoriginal paradox, Coriginal paradox, Cidentireplica paradox, Cid paradox, Videntireplica paradox, Vid paradox, Fidentireplica paradox, Isoidentireplica paradox, Bioidentireplica paradox, Enhaidentireplica paradox, Insidentireplica paradox, Musidentireplica paradox, Nrgidentireplica paradox, Tridentireplica paradox, Comboidentireplica paradox, Simidentireplica paradox, Itoidentireplica paradox,
- Original paradox argument, Idoriginal paradox argument, Coriginal paradox argument, Cidentireplica paradox argument, Cid paradox argument, Videntireplica paradox argument, Vid paradox argument, Fidentireplica paradox argument, Isoidentireplica paradox argument, Bioidentireplica paradox argument, Enhaidentireplica paradox argument, Insidentireplica paradox argument, Musidentireplica paradox argument, Nrgidentireplica paradox argument, Tridentireplica paradox argument, Comboidentireplica paradox argument, Simidentireplica paradox argument, Itoidentireplica paradox argument,
- Fazcontinuum paradox argument, Fazcontinuum paradox, neuropath continuum paradox argument, physapath continuum paradox argument, physipath continuum paradox argument, neuropath continuum paradox, physapath continuum paradox, physipath continuum paradox
awaretheory, superimmortality, science of superimmortality, superatheism, ixperiencit theory of consciousness